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Abstract 
 
Purpose: We explored the antecedents of sheriff deputies’ perceived legitimacy of their agency’s 
citizen advisory council.  
 
Design/methodology: We obtained survey data from 567 sheriff deputies in a southeastern state. 
We first asked whether respondents knew their agency had a citizen advisory council, and then 
asked those who responded affirmatively a series of questions about the legitimacy of the 
council. We then ran an OLS regression that included organizational justice, self-legitimacy, and 
public scrutiny as independent variables predicting perceived legitimacy of the citizen advisory 
council.  
 
Findings: Deputies who perceived greater organizational justice from command staff were 
significantly more likely to perceive the citizen advisory council as legitimate.  
 
Originality/value: In response to strained police/community relations, reform advocates have 
urged the police to embrace a more democratic style of policing, including allowing for more 
citizen oversight of agencies. Our study sheds light on how line-level officers perceive such 
oversight.  
 
Keywords: citizen oversight, organizational justice, self-legitimacy, public perceptions, 
democratic policing, legitimacy 
 
Paper type: Research paper 
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Police Officers’ Attitudes toward Citizen Advisory Councils 
 
In response to strained police-community relations (Weitzer 2015), reform advocates, 
scholars, and progressive leaders have called for American policing to adopt a more democratic 
style of policing (Ramsey and Robinson, 2015; Walker, 2016). For example, the President’s 
Task Force on 21st Century Policing advised agencies to encourage public engagement and 
collaboration through the formation of citizen advisory councils (CACs; also commonly referred 
to as citizen advisory committees, civilian review boards, and the like). Specifically, the Task 
Force identified the need for CACs to assist in developing, revising, and advising on agency 
policies, crime prevention strategies, and the adaptation of new technologies (Action item No. 
3.2.1 and 4.5.3).  
Although CACs may be appealing because they can improve transparency and public 
trust, police are often cynical of both their organization’s leadership and the public (Paoline, 
2003; Van Maanen, 1978). This cynicism leads to critical questions surrounding citizen 
oversight: How do line-level officers feel about this oversight, particularly during a time of 
strained police-community relations? Do they trust that the council has the community’s or 
agency’s best interests in mind? Do they believe the council serves to enhance the organization’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public? Do officers see the council as a form of community 
policing? Lack of police support for CACs could have serious consequences: it may exacerbate 
the “us v. them” problem, diminish police faith in their organization’s leadership, or cause 
officers to do less in order to avoid scrutiny from civilians (Rushin and Edwards, 2017; Stone et 
al., 2009). Understanding the factors associated with officers’ support for CACs is foundational 
to ensuring that they are effective in their democratic policing intent.  
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The current study explored the factors associated with officers’ perceived legitimacy of a 
CAC using survey data collected from a sheriff’s department in the southeastern US. Using a 
sample of 567 deputies, we first asked respondents if they were aware of their agency’s CAC. 
Deputies who were aware of their agency’s council were asked a series of questions about 
potential benefits of the council, such as whether it helps their agency’s community policing 
efforts or improves their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Drawing on prior studies, which 
have examined support for other types of democratic policing, we also considered deputies’ 
perceptions of organizational justice, their self-legitimacy, and their perceptions of public 
scrutiny. We expected each of these sentiments to be associated with their perceptions of their 
CAC.  
Democratic Policing 
Successful policing in democratic societies is highly contingent on the level of consent 
provided by citizens. The police cannot be effective if they do not garner consent from the 
public; citizens must acknowledge the police as holding legitimate authority and they must 
consent to being policed (Manning, 2015; Tyler, 1990). Policing by consent involves the public 
willingly giving up some of their rights in exchange for protection from the police as 
representatives of the government. This social contract facilitates cooperation and legal 
compliance from the public. What is more, when the public believes the police hold legitimate 
authority and consent to their power, they are more likely to empower the police; they are more 
likely to trust the police have the appropriate expertise in deciding how best to fulfill their 
mandate (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003).  
Consent from the public is best achieved through democratic styles of policing, which 
can take a variety of forms (Walker, 2016). For example, officers can ensure democratic policing 
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at the interaction-level by treating citizens with dignity and respect, allowing them a voice during 
interactions, and clearly explaining the reasons for their decisions (Jackson et al., 2012; Tyler, 
1990; Wolfe et al., 2016). At the agency-level, many departments have adopted community-
oriented policing models over the past few decades (Reisig, 2010). In practice, community-
oriented policing varies considerably, but generally it involves integrating the public in decision-
making processes. For example, community-oriented policing agencies typically elicit 
participation from the public in devising strategies to combat crime and disorder problems in 
their community (Goldstein, 1987; Maguire and Mastrofski, 2000).  
Citizen oversight is another manifestation of democratic policing, which can be broken 
down into three categories: investigation-focused, review-focused, and auditor/monitor-focused 
(De Angelis et al., 2016; Walker, 2001, 2016). CACs are a review-focused form of oversight, 
allowing the community to weigh in on internal policies, disciplinary matters, citizen complaints, 
and other issues. Establishing CACs allows police agencies to provide the public a voice, ensure 
citizens play a role in developing or revising the type of policing that ultimately impacts their 
communities, and sends the message that together the police and public are part of the same 
community. When implemented properly, CACs can be key to ensuring a democratic style of 
policing for the public (Walker, 2016). 
Perceived legitimacy of CACs by line-level officers is potentially key to their success. 
Officers who view the council as more legitimate, for example, are likely more apt to accept the 
council’s recommendations regarding policy and disciplinary matters. On the other extreme, 
officers who do not trust their CAC may undermine its efforts by treating the public poorly on 
the street. For example, officers who mistrust a council’s recommendations may be less trusting 
of the public in general and be less likely to treat them in a procedurally fair manner (Bottoms 
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and Tankebe, 2012). Officers who lack trust in such councils or believe they do not have their 
agency’s or community’s best interests in mind may respond by withdrawing from their 
responsibilities. De-policing may occur as a way of avoiding the perceived unfairness of citizen 
oversight in the form of an advisory council (Oliver, 2017; Stone et al., 2009). Indeed, the push 
for citizen oversight of police actions dates back at least to the Kerner Commission and was 
historically resisted by police executives (Walker, 2016). The International Association of Chiefs 
of Police, for example, released an official statement opposing citizen oversight in 1964 (Walker, 
2016). Accordingly, understanding the factors associated with officers’ support for CACs is key 
to developing new or improving existing councils. Agencies with CACs viewed as legitimate by 
their line-level officers likely will be in a better spot to have such councils achieve their 
democratic policing goals. 
Theoretically Salient Predictors of Officer Attitudes 
Toward CACs 
 Extant research has considered police officers’ commitment to various examples of 
democratic policing including community-oriented policing (Myhill and Bradford, 2013) and 
procedural justice (Tankebe, 2014a). CACs are yet another reflection of democratic policing, but 
it is not clear how officers feel about giving citizens such oversight. Before turning to our 
methodology and results, we discuss three potential antecedents of officers’ perceived legitimacy 
of CACs – organizational justice, self-legitimacy, and public scrutiny.  
Organizational Justice 
Studies have long demonstrated the importance of organizational justice – that is, fairness 
– within the workplace environment. Organizational justice is comprised of three elements: 
distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice. Distributive justice refers to the 
extent that employees perceive the distribution of outcomes in their organization as fair (Adams, 
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1963). For example, when managers fairly distribute salary increases, promotions, or disciplinary 
actions (i.e., without favoritism), employees are more likely to be satisfied and to behave in ways 
that benefit the organization, such as putting in extra effort (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001; 
Lind and Tyler, 1988). In contrast, procedural justice refers to the extent employees believe they 
are treated fairly by their organization. Specifically, employees want their voices heard and to 
know that processes are unbiased and consistent (Levanthal, 1980). Again, extant research 
demonstrates that employees who feel their organization adheres to fair procedures are more 
likely to engage in beneficial behaviors (Colquitt et al., 2001). The third element – interactional 
justice – pertains to honesty and politeness by supervisors during interpersonal communication 
with employees (Bies and Moag, 1986).  
Police departments are similar to other business settings – they are hierarchically 
structured and they consist of employees working toward the same goals. Thus, criminologists 
have increasingly begun to explore the effects of organizational justice within police 
departments. Collectively, this body of research suggests that like employees in other fields, 
officers tend to be more satisfied and committed to their jobs when they are treated fairly by their 
organization (Donner et al., 2015). Bradford et al. (2014), for example, showed that perceptions 
of organizational justice were associated with greater identification with the agency and 
procedural compliance (see also Rosenbaum and McCarty, 2017; Tyler et al., 2007). Likewise, 
Wolfe and Piquero (2011) found that perceived organizational justice was associated with less 
misconduct.  
Other recent studies suggest that the benefits of organizational justice extend beyond the 
walls of the department and into the community, in the form of commitment to democratic 
policing. Studies by Haas et al. (2015) and Van Craen and Skogan (2017), for example, indicate 
7 
 
that “internal” procedural justice (i.e., by the supervisors in a department) is associated with 
support for greater restrictions on the use of force. Myhill and Bradford (2013) showed 
organizational justice predicted higher levels of commitment to community-oriented policing. 
Similarly, Tankebe (2014a) showed officers who perceived greater fairness within their 
department were significantly more supportive of exercising procedural justice during their 
interactions with citizens. Trinkner and colleagues’ (2016) study illuminated the causal 
mechanisms underlying such results. Specifically, they demonstrated that organizational justice 
was associated with greater perceived legitimacy of the agency, less cynicism, and less 
psychological distress among officers. In turn, these outcomes were all directly associated with 
commitment to democratic policing in the form of increased support for community policing and 
procedural justice during citizen interactions, and decreased support for the use of coercive force. 
We are unaware of any studies that have explored the relationship between perceived 
organizational justice and attitudes toward CACs, but based on the available literature, we 
developed the following hypothesis:  
1. Deputies who perceive their command staff and organization’s policies as more fair 
will afford greater legitimacy to their CAC. 
Self-Legitimacy 
Another potential antecedent of officers’ perceived legitimacy of CACs is the confidence 
they have that their authority as police officers is morally justified – that is, their self-legitimacy 
(Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). Studies have established a positive correlation between self-
legitimacy and outcomes like organizational commitment and identity, as well as a negative 
correlation between self-legitimacy and cynicism (Bradford and Quinton, 2014; Tankebe and 
Meško, 2015). Recent research suggests self-legitimacy is also associated with endorsement of 
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democratic policing. For instance, Bradford and Quinton (2014) demonstrated that officers with 
greater self-legitimacy were more committed to exercising procedural justice with citizens and 
protecting their due process rights. In the US, Wolfe and Nix (2016a) found that self-legitimacy 
was strongly associated with officers’ willingness to engage in community partnerships. Again, 
we are not aware of any studies that have explored the direct relationship between self-
legitimacy and attitudes toward CACs. However, given the overlap between these 
aforementioned manifestations of democratic policing and CACs, officers who possess greater 
self-legitimacy should be more embracive of (or less worried about) the transparency and 
oversight that a CAC may provide. Accordingly, we test the following hypothesis: 
2. Deputies who express greater self-legitimacy will afford greater legitimacy to their 
CAC.  
Public Scrutiny 
A third possible predictor of officers’ evaluations of CAC legitimacy is the extent they 
believe citizens support the police. In recent years, there has been growing concern about 
criticism of the police, such that the U.S. citizenry is waging a “war on cops” (Maguire et al., 
2017; Morin et al., 2017; Nix et al., 2018). At least one study suggests officers believe the media 
is generally biased and hostile toward their profession (Nix and Pickett, 2017). Further 
complicating matters, the same study revealed that those who felt the media was more hostile 
toward police were more likely to believe the public is distrusting of them and more fearful of 
being falsely accused of misconduct.  
The idea that police officers are distrusting of citizens is nothing new. Ethnographic 
studies of police organizations carried out nearly half a century ago suggested that police officers 
harbored cynical attitudes toward citizens, viewed them as unsupportive and “out to make the 
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police look bad” (Van Maanen, 1978:322), and embraced an “us versus them” mentality 
(Skolnick, 2011). Sparrow et al. (1990:51) provide the following illustrative quote from a police 
officer: 
No one else understands the real nature of police work. That is, no one outside the police 
service – academics, politicians, and lawyers in particular – can comprehend what we 
have to do. The public is generally naïve about police work…Members of the public are 
basically unsupportive and unreasonably demanding. They all seem to think they know 
our job better than we do.  
Distrust of citizens and support for aggressive styles of policing remain prevalent 
elements of police subculture (Paoline, 2003). These attitudes serve as barriers to policing 
reforms including those that emphasize democratic ideals (Schulhofer et al., 2011; Skogan, 
2008). Indeed, one recent study demonstrated that alignment with such a “traditional police 
culture” was associated with less support for exercising procedural justice with citizens and more 
support for using coercive force (Silver et al., 2017). Likewise, it seems unlikely that officers 
who are afraid citizens are out to get them or make them look bad would be receptive to the idea 
of giving citizens a voice in agency disciplinary decisions and other matters. Therefore, our final 
hypothesis is as follows: 
3. Deputies who feel public scrutiny has increased recently and made their job more 
difficult will afford less legitimacy to their CAC. 
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Methodology 
Research Setting 
 Our data were obtained from a survey of a metropolitan sheriff’s department in the 
southeastern US. It is the largest law enforcement agency in its state, with 666 sworn deputies 
employed at the time of our study. It has five divisions – Uniform, Criminal Investigation, 
Special Projects, Professional Standards, and Administration – each under the command of a 
Chief Deputy. The Uniform Division is responsible for patrolling the seven regions of the 
county, which was home to approximately 398,000 residents according to 2015 American 
Community Survey 5-year estimates. Roughly 47% of the residents are white and 46% are 
African American. The median household income in 2015 was $49,131. According to the 
Uniform Crime Report, there were 2,357 violent crimes and 8,991 property crimes in the 
jurisdiction in 2015.  
 This department has its own CAC – a diverse group of 26 residents of the county that 
includes ministers, retired military veterans, academics, and community leaders. The council has 
three primary duties: 
1. Review citizens’ complaints against deputies 
2. Review disciplinary actions against deputies 
3. Review departmental policies and procedures 
The Sheriff meets with the council approximately four times per year. The council reviews cases 
to determine whether they believe the department’s actions were appropriate or not. If not, 
Internal Affairs revisits the case. Members are appointed by the Sheriff and serve indefinitely.  
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Survey Administration 
 In February 2015, the first and second authors invited all sworn deputies (N=666) to 
participate in an online survey that focused broadly on organizational climate within the 
department. To encourage participation, deputies were informed that their identities would 
remain anonymous, data would only be analyzed in the aggregate, and only the researchers 
would have access to the raw data. The survey was also endorsed by the agency’s deputy 
advisory council – a group of respected employees who represent the interests of their colleagues 
at routine meetings with command staff. No incentives were offered for participation. Of the 666 
deputies eligible to participate, 567 submitted a survey, resulting in an 85.1% response rate. For 
the purposes of this study, we were interested in deputies’ attitudes toward their CAC. However, 
we recognized it was possible some deputies would not be aware the council existed. Therefore, 
we included a filter question that asked “Do you know what the CAC is?” Approximately one-
half of our sample (50.7%; n=288) answered affirmatively (see Figure 1). Accordingly, we 
restricted our analytic sample to these 288 deputies who indicated familiarity with the CAC.1  
[Figure 1 here] 
Dependent Variable 
 Our dependent variable captures deputies’ perceived legitimacy of their CAC. We asked 
respondents to indicate their level of agreement (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree) with 
the following statements: “The CAC makes recommendations that have the community’s best 
                                                 
1 An anonymous reviewer pointed out that deputies assigned to patrol might be more likely to indicate familiarity 
with the CAC, given the CAC likely focuses on these deputies who are more visible to the community. A chi-square 
test of independence indicated no significant differences in CAC familiarity across assignment [χ2 = .057 (1), p = 
.81]. Furthermore, there were no significant differences across race [χ2 (1) = .79, p = .37], education [χ2 (4) = 4.251, 
p = .37], or military background [χ2 (1) = 1.020, p = .31]. However, there were significant differences in CAC 
familiarity across age [χ2 (3) = 30.511, p > .000], gender [χ2 (1) = 9.502, p = .002], and experience [χ2 (4) = 26.534, 
p < .000], such that older, male, and more experienced deputies were more likely to report being familiar with the 
CAC. 
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interests in mind,” “The CAC helps maintain our agency’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public,” 
and “The CAC helps maintain our agency’s community policing efforts.” The mean Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) index of factorial simplicity was 0.70, indicating sufficient sampling 
adequacy (Kaiser and Rice, 1974). Principal factor analysis indicated that responses to the three 
items loaded onto a single factor (loadings >.70), and Cronbach’s alpha demonstrated adequate 
internal consistency (α=.88). Therefore, we averaged responses to the items to form a mean 
index, CAC legitimacy. Higher scores on the index reflect greater perceived legitimacy of the 
council. The mean of the index was 3.72. As shown in Figure 2, roughly 60 to 65% of the sample 
agreed or strongly agreed with each of the items included in the index. Approximately one-third 
of the sample felt neutral about each of the three items, while the remaining 3% disagreed or 
strongly disagreed with each. Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and all other 
variables included in our analyses are presented in Table 1.  
[Figure 2 here] 
[Table 1 here] 
Independent Variables 
 Organizational justice. Our first hypothesis was that deputies who perceived greater 
fairness from command staff would view their CAC as more legitimate. We presented 
respondents with eighteen items that captured their perceptions of procedural (e.g., “Command 
staff considers employees’ viewpoints”), distributive (e.g., “Command staff treats employees the 
same regardless of their race or ethnicity”), and interactional justice (e.g., “Generally, command 
staff treats employees with respect”), and asked them to report their level of agreement 
(1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree) with each. A complete list of the items is available in 
the Appendix. The mean KMO of .95 indicated sufficient sampling adequacy, and responses 
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loaded onto a single factor (loadings >.61). Furthermore, Cronbach’s alpha indicated strong 
internal consistency (α=.96). Thus, we averaged responses to the eighteen items to generate a 
mean index, Organizational Justice, whereby higher scores represent greater perceived fairness 
by the agency’s command staff.  
 Self-legitimacy. Our second hypothesis was that respondents with greater self-legitimacy 
would have higher evaluations of CAC legitimacy. To capture respondents’ level of self-
legitimacy, we presented them with a series of statements adapted from Tankebe (2014b). 
Specifically, they were asked to indicate their level of agreement (1=strongly disagree to 
5=strongly agree) with the following five statements: “I have confidence in the authority vested 
in me as a law enforcement officer,” “As a law enforcement officer, I believe I occupy a position 
of special importance in society,” “I believe people should always do what I tell them as long as 
my orders are lawful,” “I am confident I have enough authority to do my job well,” and “I 
believe law enforcement is capable of providing security for all citizens of this county.” The 
mean KMO was .73, indicating sufficient sampling adequacy. Responses to the items loaded 
onto a single factor (loadings >.43) and Cronbach’s alpha suggested acceptable internal 
consistency (α=.66).  We averaged responses to the five items to create a mean index, Self-
legitimacy, with higher scores indicating greater confidence in one’s authority as a police officer.  
 Public scrutiny. We also hypothesized that deputies who perceived higher levels of 
public scrutiny in recent months would perceive the CAC as less legitimate. Deputies were asked 
to report their level of agreement (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree) with three 
statements: “In general US citizens’ views of the police have gotten worse over the past 6 
months,” “Over the past 6 months, county residents’ perceptions of law enforcement have gotten 
worse,” and “Over the past 6 months, it has become more dangerous to be a law enforcement 
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officer because of negative publicity surrounding law enforcement.”2 The mean KMO was .60 
and responses loaded onto a single factor (loadings >.51). Moreover, Cronbach’s alpha suggested 
acceptable internal consistency (α=.65). We averaged responses to the three items to generate a 
mean index, Public Scrutiny. Higher scores on the index reflect a belief that public attitudes 
toward the police have gotten worse, and that it has become more dangerous to be a police 
officer, over the previous six months.  
Controls 
 We included seven control variables in our multivariate models in an effort to minimize 
concern that any observed relationships between our independent and dependent variables were 
spurious. Specifically, we accounted for the respondents’ gender (1=male), race (1=nonwhite), 
education level (1=bachelor’s degree or higher), assignment (1=patrol, 0=other assignment), and 
military experience (1=yes) with binary variables. We controlled for respondents’ age with an 
ordinal variable (1=21 to 30, 2=31 to 40, 3=41 to 50, 4=51 or older) to help ensure anonymity. 
Likewise, respondents’ tenure with the agency was measured with an ordinal variable (1=less 
than one year, 2=1 to 5 years, 3=6 to 9 years, 4=10 to 15 years, and 5=more than 15 years).  
Analytic Strategy 
 The first step of our analysis was to examine the bivariate relationship between our 
dependent variable and each of our three key independent variables of interest. This step served 
to establish preliminary evidence that each of the correlations were in the hypothesized 
directions. Furthermore, the fact that none of the correlations exceeded |.56| suggested that 
multicollinearity would not be a concern in the second step of the analysis (Tabachnick and 
                                                 
2 The survey was administered approximately six months after the fatal shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson. An 
incredible amount of media attention during this time was devoted to police use of force and public criticism of 
police.  
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Fidell, 2013). The second step entailed a multivariate analysis. We ran a series of four ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression equations because our dependent variable approximated 
normality (skewness= -.251, kurtosis= 3.708). The first three equations included each of our 
three key independent variables separately. In turn, the fourth included all three simultaneously. 
This process served to help us determine if any of the independent variables appeared to be more 
closely associated with deputies’ attitudes toward the legitimacy of the CAC. As an additional 
check for multicollinearity, we post-estimated the variance inflation factors, all of which were 
less than 1.44. These values fall within acceptable ranges and suggest that multicollinearity is not 
a concern in the results below (Belsley et al., 1980).  
Results 
 Table 2 displays a pairwise correlation matrix for the dependent and independent 
variables along with each of the controls. Each of the independent variables was correlated with 
CAC legitimacy in the hypothesized direction. At the bivariate level, organizational justice 
(r=.559, p<.01) appeared most closely related to perceived legitimacy of the CAC. The 
correlation between self-legitimacy and CAC legitimacy (r=.132, p<.05), though statistically 
significant, was much weaker. As hypothesized, deputies who perceived greater public scrutiny 
(r= -.253, p<.01) perceived the CAC as less legitimate, at least at the bivariate level. 
Interestingly, deputies assigned to the patrol division (r= -.144, p<.05) also viewed the CAC as 
less legitimate relative to their colleagues in other divisions.  
[Table 2 here] 
 Table 3 displays each of our OLS regression models. In Model 1, we regressed the 
dependent variable onto our organizational justice index along with each of the seven control 
variables. The model was statistically significant and explained nearly 38% of the variance in 
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deputies’ evaluations of CAC legitimacy. As expected, the organizational justice coefficient was 
positive and statistically significant (b=.561, p<.01), net of the demographic statistical control 
variables. Note, however, that deputies with military experience expressed significantly more 
favorable attitudes toward the CAC than those without military experience (b=.236, p<.01).  
[Table 3 here] 
Models 2 and 3 regressed CAC legitimacy onto self-legitimacy and public scrutiny, 
respectively, along with each of the controls. Note that each of these models explain far less 
variation in the outcome (R2=.05 and .09, respectively), and Model 2, as a whole, was not 
statistically significant (F-test=1.64, p>.05). Still, both self-legitimacy and public scrutiny were 
significantly associated with the outcome in the hypothesized directions, net of the controls. In 
Model 4, we ran a fully saturated regression equation that included all three of the key 
independent variables along with the controls. The results indicated that perceptions of 
organizational justice (b=.562, p<.01) were the most closely connected to CAC legitimacy. In 
fact, the effects of self-legitimacy and public scrutiny were reduced to non-significance in this 
model after the inclusion of organizational justice. Military background (b=.237, p<.01) was 
statistically significant, but a comparison of the standardized coefficients suggested its 
relationship with CAC legitimacy (β=.176) was much weaker than that of organizational justice 
(β=.622). With these findings in mind, we now turn to a discussion of our study’s implications. 
Discussion 
 Democratic policing integrates the public into police decision making and considers 
citizens’ views on agency policies and strategic decision-making (Manning, 2015). Such efforts 
have been the focus of key transitions in the history of policing and police-community relations. 
For example, rampant corruption during the political era of policing gave way to a more 
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professional style of police beginning around the 1930s that sought to increase the efficiency, 
and thereby effectiveness, of policing (Walker, 1998). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, we 
witnessed agencies adopt community-oriented policing philosophies to increase transparency and 
integrate the public into police decision making (Reisig, 2010). These changes sought to improve 
the public’s trust in the police by adhering more wholly to the Peelian principle that the police 
are the public and that the public are the police—the essence of democratic policing. 
Police agencies have used many strategies to ensure they deliver democratic policing to 
the public. Some departments have fundamentally changed their structure and philosophy to 
work more closely with their communities to identify problems (Greene, 2000; Maguire, 1997). 
Several agencies have gone as far as implementing front porch roll calls—rather than holding 
briefings in the station house, they routinely meet in a community member’s front yard (Fox, 
2016; Kulmala, 2016). A re-emerging trend, and one advocated by President Obama’s Task 
Force on 21st Century Policing, is the establishment of CACs in an effort to provide more 
participation, voice, and transparency to the public. Broadly speaking, these entities strive to 
integrate the public into decisions that impact their community. Providing a voice and increasing 
transparency sends the message to the public that they are valued members of society and are 
active partners with the police. By extension, CACs may serve as a vehicle for improving 
communication and cooperation between the police and public and deconstructing barriers 
between them.  
Establishing and empowering a CAC, therefore, may be beneficial to a police agency and 
its community for many reasons. The problem is that CACs may lack legitimacy in the eyes of 
officers because they are comprised of “outsiders.” The degree to which officers perceive their 
CAC as a legitimate oversight committee likely impacts how successful the council is in 
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achieving some of the goals discussed above. A largely unexplored empirical question remains: 
what factors are associated with officers’ evaluations of CAC legitimacy? We sought to answer 
this question by analyzing survey data from a sample of sheriff deputies in a southeastern 
agency. One significant finding from our study was that only about half of the sample indicated 
they were aware their agency had a CAC. This is interesting because their CAC oversees all 
citizen complaints, deputy disciplinary decisions, and policy changes. The CAC’s deliberations 
have a direct impact on the responding deputies’ working environments. Regularly discussing 
the CAC with members of an agency is an important first step for departments attempting to gain 
buy-in from their officers. 
A more positive finding, however, was that among those deputies who were familiar with 
their agency’s CAC, most had a favorable evaluation of its legitimacy. It is important to note that 
the agency we surveyed has relatively high levels of community support and a positive 
relationship with its residents. The Sheriff has been re-elected to the position several times since 
the mid-1990s and is well-liked in the community and within the agency. Such characteristics 
may help explain why our data demonstrated relatively positive views of the agency’s CAC. At 
the same time, however, variation existed in deputies’ attitudes. Thus, understanding what 
explains deputies’ perceived legitimacy of the CAC is a critical question. 
Consistent with prior research that examined the predictors of support of democratic 
styles of policing, we found that perceptions of organizational justice, self-legitimacy, and public 
scrutiny were all related to deputies’ evaluations of CAC legitimacy in the expected directions. 
However, when all three key theoretical variables were included in a single regression equation, 
only the organizational justice effect remained statistically significant. This finding adds to a 
growing body of evidence demonstrating the benefit of organizational justice within police 
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agencies. Prior research has revealed that organizational justice is associated with beneficial 
work-related outcomes among officers—greater support of agency goals, less cynicism, and 
greater agency trust (Bradford and Quinton, 2014; Wolfe and Nix, 2016a). Our study shows that 
another beneficial outcome of organizational justice is officer buy-in to an important mechanism 
of democratic policing—greater perceived legitimacy of CACs. Achieving perceived legitimacy 
of CACs appears important because it may lead to a situation where officers can learn from 
citizens’ viewpoints, learn from mistakes, make corrective action when necessary, and ultimately 
improve the quality of service provided to the community. Additionally, CACs may provide a 
great opportunity for members of the public to witness how well trained, self-controlled, and 
professional their officers are. Having officers fail to perceive the council as legitimate, however, 
may create obstacles for agencies attempting to fulfill these goals. Ensuring a climate of 
respectful supervisor treatment, open lines of communication, and transparency with 
subordinates will likely cultivate greater perceived legitimacy in an agency’s CAC. 
Another key finding was that the organizational justice effect confounded the relationship 
between self-legitimacy, public scrutiny, and CAC legitimacy. This is consistent with prior 
research showing that organizational justice evaluations outpace the role of perceive negative 
publicity on officers’ orientations toward the public (Wolfe and Nix, 2016a). Thus, police 
managers can help shield their officers from the potential harmful effects of public scrutiny by 
ensuring organizational justice within their agencies (Nix and Wolfe, 2016). This seems 
particularly relevant to police managers in a time of tense community relations around the US 
(Wolfe and Nix, 2016b). 
Our study was not without limitations, which provide avenues for future research. For 
one, our sample comes from a single sheriff’s department in the southeast that has relatively 
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good community relations. Views of CACs in jurisdictions lacking public confidence may be 
fundamentally different than those observed here. Future research should attempt to build on our 
findings by exploring officers’ perceptions of CACs in other agencies, particularly those with 
strained community relations. Because this was the first study of its kind, we may have 
unintentionally failed to account for other potentially important predictors of CAC legitimacy. 
For example, officers’ perceptions of other governing bodies (e.g., city/county council, mayor, 
city manager) may also impact officers’ views of their agency’s CAC (Crank and Langworthy, 
1992). If officers believe the implementation of a CAC or its decisions/recommendations are 
influenced by politics, for example, this may have a negative effect on officers’ evaluations of 
the committee’s legitimacy. Relatedly, the Sheriff handpicks community members to serve on 
the CAC. It is possible that a more democratic and transparent selection process would improve 
deputies’ perceptions of the council. Finally, it would be interesting for future researchers to 
explore how officers’ evaluations of CACs change over time and determine what factors explain 
those changes. Can high profile or controversial use of force investigations or officer disciplinary 
recommendations influence officers’ perceptions of their CAC? 
The US is a democracy, and our government agencies purport to serve our interests and 
desires. As a result, we have witnessed further integration of the community into police decision-
making processes over the years. This move toward a more democratic style of policing is 
necessary to ensure community trust, perceived legitimacy, public cooperation, and compliance 
with the law (Tyler, 1990; Tyler and Huo, 2002). Agencies that do not actively pursue strategies 
for community integration risk sending the message that the public’s voice is not valued. This 
could ultimately erode trust, legitimacy, cooperation, and compliance over time. CACs are one 
way for agencies to deliver democratic policing to the public. Having such a council does not 
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mean that agencies, their executives, or their officers need to bow to public opinion. After all, the 
police have their own set of expertise that is distinct from that of the public. But, agencies should 
not ignore the voice and opinions of citizens who sit on such councils. Democratic policing is 
policing that acknowledges the role of the public in helping police itself.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics.  
Variable N Mean/% SD Min Max 
CAC legitimacy 285 3.527 .636 1 5 
Organizational justice 287 3.641 .754 1 5 
Self-legitimacy 287 4.144 .547 2 5 
Public scrutiny 288 3.578 .766 1 5 
Male 272 80.5% — 0 1 
Nonwhite 267 27.3% — 0 1 
Age 274 2.741 .981 1 4 
Bachelor’s Degree 273 56.0% — 0 1 
Experience 267 3.543 1.180 1 5 
Patrol 269 39.8% — 0 1 
Military 272 39.0% — 0 1 
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Table 2. Pairwise correlation matrix.  
Variable  Y1 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 
Y1 CAC legitimacy  1.000           
 N 285           
X1 Organizational justice  .559** 1.000          
 N 284 287          
X2 Self-legitimacy  .132* .264** 1.000         
 N 284 287 287         
X3 Public scrutiny  -.253** -.333** .006 1.000        
 N 285 287 287 288        
X4 Male  .018 .014 .023 -.117 1.000       
 N 269 271 271 272 272       
X5 Nonwhite  -.022 -.062 .141* -.039 -.035a 1.000      
 N 265 266 266 267 263 267      
X6 Age  .104 .184** .120* -.155* .094 .168** 1.000     
 N 271 273 273 274 270 264 274     
X7 Bachelor’s degree  .016 -.069 .001 .122* -.205a -.151a -.086 1.000    
 N 271 272 272 273 269 265 270 273    
X8 Experience  .078 .000 .041 -.114 .097 .033 .461** .027 1.000   
 N 264 266 266 267 263 259 265 265 267   
X9 Patrol  -.144* -.230** -.012 .089 .370**a -.126a -.260** -.107a -.212** 1.000  
 N 266 268 268 269 265 262 267 267 263 269  
X10 Military  .075 -.080 .084 -.056 .419**a .308**a .116 -.254*a -.046 .218*a 1.000 
 N 269 271 271 272 268 264 269 270 264 267 272 
NOTE: Correlations are Pearson’s r (two-tailed test) unless otherwise noted. 
aTetrachoric correlation (Spearman’s rho; two-tailed test). 
*p<.05;**p<.01 
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Table 3. The effects of organizational justice, self-legitimacy, and public scrutiny on CAC legitimacy.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable b SE β b SE β b SE β b SE β 
Org. justice .561** .050 .621 — — — — — — .562** .056 .622 
Self-legitimacy — — — .155* .078 .128 — — — -.044 .067 -.037 
Public scrutiny — — — — — — -.192** .054 -.227 -.022 .048 -.026 
Male -.011 .093 -.007 .059 .114 .034 .026 .113 .015 -.014 .093 -.008 
Nonwhite .013 .078 .009 -.119 .095 -.082 -.100 .093 -.069 .020 .079 .014 
Age -.043 .041 -.064 .040 .049 .061 .039 .048 .059 -.042 .041 -.063 
Bachelor’s degree .107 .070 .080 .020 .086 .015 .066 .085 .049 .113 .071 .085 
Experience .059 .033 .107 .007 .040 .013 .000 .039 -.001 .058 .033 .105 
Patrol .001 .076 .001 -.175 .092 -.131 -.153 .090 -.115 .006 .076 .004 
Military .236** .075 .175 .139 .092 .103 .142 .091 .105 .237** .076 .176 
Intercept 1.433** .242 — 2.955** .357 — 4.303** .282 — 1.688** .388 — 
             
F-test  17.78**   1.64   2.86**   14.23**  
R2 (Adj. R2) . 375(.354) .053(.021) .088(.057) .377(.351) 
N  246   246   247   246  
*p<.05;**p<.01 
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Figure 1. Percentage of respondents who indicated they knew what the CAC was (N=567).  
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Figure 2. Perceived legitimacy of the CAC (restricted to those who indicated they knew what it 
was; N=288). 
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The CAC helps maintain our 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
The CAC helps us maintain our 
community policing efforts.
The CAC makes recommendations 
that have the community’s best 
interests in mind. 
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Appendix 
 
Organizational Justice Items 
 
1. My agency’s policies are designed to generate standards so that decisions can be made 
with consistency. 
2. My agency’s policies are designed to allow employees to have a voice in agency 
decisions (e.g., assignment changes, discipline). 
3. My agency’s performance evaluation system is fair. 
4. My agency’s investigation of civilian complaints is fair. 
5. I understand clearly what type of behavior will result in discipline within my agency. 
6. Landing a good assignment in my agency is based on whom you know (reverse coded). 
7. If you work hard, you can get ahead at this agency. 
8. As an organization, my agency can be trusted to do what is right for the community. 
9. I trust the direction that my department’s command staff is taking our agency. 
10. I feel confident about top management’s skills. 
11. Command staff considers employees’ viewpoints. 
12. Command staff treats employees with kindness and consideration. 
13. Command staff treats employees the same regardless of their gender. 
14. Command staff treats employees the same regardless of their race or ethnicity. 
15. Command staff clearly explains the reasons for their decisions. 
16. Command staff clearly explains the reasons the agency makes policy changes. 
17. Generally, command staff treats employees with respect. 
18. I trust that command staff makes decisions that have the agency’s best interest in mind. 
